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Introduction
According to just war theory, a just war is a war against military
aggression or the serious intentional threat of military aggression or a war
of intervention to protect fundamental human rights. A just war must also
satisfy a proportionality norm: the reasonably expected moral gains of
commencing and sustaining military intervention must exceed the reasonably expected moral costs.' In this tradition, the justice of the war is
T I am grateful to the Institute for Ethics and Public Affairs at San Diego State
University for inviting me to give a presentation in February, 2003, which ultimately
evolved into this essay. I presented versions of this essay at the August, 2003 American
Political Science Association meeting, the October, 2003 Southern California Philosophy
Conference at UC Riverside, and the Cornell International Law Journal 2006
Symposium. I thank the audiences at these events and my commentators Ruti Teitel,
David Whippman, and Burke Hendrix at the Cornell Symposium for helpful criticism.
Thanks also to Thomas Hurka for instructive conversation and to Ethics readers and
editors, Larry Alexander, Joseph Boyle, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Jeff McMahan,
Richard Miller, Darrel Moellendorf, Douglas Portmore, Mathias Risse, Hillel Steiner, and
George Wright for very useful written comments.
1. This statement requires interpretation. Just as one may use lethal self-defense, if
necessary, to defend against a serious but non-lethal attack, a nation may respond to an
aggressor with greater force than was employed against it. Injuries suffered by the
aggressor will be discounted in the just war calculation.
39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 663 (2006)
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regarded as a separate issue from the justice of the conduct of the war.
Justice in warfare requires, above all, respect for noncombatant immunity.2
Those engaged in war are prohibited from deliberately attacking those who
are not soldiers, those who are not political leaders of soldiers, and those
who are not supplying soldiers with the necessities to carry out warfare.
Combatants are those whose activities materially assist the war effort (or in
a more narrow construction, those engaged in the war effort).
The right of noncombatant immunity forbids inflicting harm on noncombatants as either an end in itself or as a means to an end. In other
3
words, noncombatants have the right not to be deliberate targets of attack.
The right of noncombatant immunity, however, condones unintended
harm to noncombatants, provided the proportionality norm described earlier is observed. The proportionality norm means that the good effect that
one aims to achieve must be greater than the collateral damage to noncombatants that one foresees, but does not intend. Additionally, the proportionality norm requires that there must not be another option available that
realizes the same expected benefit but with less expected collateral damage.
Noncombatant immunity also extends to combatants who have ceased to
be contributors to the war effort, either by surrendering or by becoming
incapacitated. 4
This essay examines the justice in warfare component of the just war
theory.5 How should we regard the right of noncombatant immunity as
just characterized? Common-sense rhetoric tends to regard respect for
noncombatant immunity as a litmus test for moral rectitude. Contemporary statements of just war theory reflect this view, as in this succinct formulation: "Terrorism strikes at the defenseless, not at the combatant forces
of a social unit, and is thus by nature a crime against humanity. '6 Politicians appeal to this sentiment, drawing sharp lines between "us" and
"them." The first Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Tom
Ridge, observed, "We face a hate-filled, remorseless enemy that takes many
forms, hides in many places, and doesn't distinguish between innocent
civilians and military combatants." 7 My question is the following: what is
the nature and moral force of this distinction?8 I shall conclude that we
2.

See generally MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977) for an excellent
RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR: FORCE

contemporary statement of just war theory. See also PAUL
AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1968).

3. See WALZER, supra note 2, at 43.
4. See generally WALZER, supra note 2; RAMSEY, supra note 2.
5. See generally Jefferson McMahan, Innocence, Self-Defense, and Killing in War, 2 J.
POL. PHIL. 193 (1994) which anticipates some of my arguments and conclusions. See
also Jefferson McMahan, Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker, 104 ETHICS 252 (1994); Jefferson McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693 (2004)
[hereinafter McMahan, Killing in War]; Lionel K. McPherson, Innocence and Responsibility in War, 34 CAN. J. PHIL. 485 (2004).
6. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, CAN MODERN WAR BE JUST? 60 (1984).
7. Serge Schmemann, The Quarrel over Iraq Gets Ugly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2003, at
WK1.
8. My conclusion is that just warfare theory, on its own terms, does not issue an
absolute condemnation, free from exceptions, of what we are prone to call terrorist acts.
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should reject the idea that just warfare theory prescribes an absolute and
exception-free condemnation of what we are prone to call terrorist acts.
Although it is not universally accepted, the norm that warring nations
should not deliberately attack civilians under any circumstances is deeply
engrained in popular moral opinion and embodied in current international law and treaties. 9 Despite the criticisms developed below, the wide
acceptance of these norms may be doing significant good. So why criticize
them? My suspicion is that the position that the duty to refrain from
attacking civilians in war and military operations is well supported by
acceptable, fundamental nonconsequentialist' ° moral principles is
unfounded. And like any unfounded moral position, it probably does
more harm than most like to think.
The following examination of just war theory represents an internal
rather than external critique of this philosophical position. The key question here is not what we should regard as morally acceptable, all things
considered. Instead, the question is what is morally acceptable according
to the deontological tradition of moral thought, in particular what is the
morality of self-defense against aggressive attack? I must give notice at the
outset that this account of the morality of self-defense is, to some degree,
revisionary. I conclude that just warfare theory, as recently elaborated by
Michael Walzer, Paul Ramsey, and other distinguished thinkers, rests on
11
fundamental errors.
9. See WALZER, supra note 2, at 136.
10. In ethical theory, nonconsequentialism is the denial of consequentialism, the
position that one morally ought always to do an act that would produce an outcome no
worse than the outcome that would have been brought about by any other act one might
have done instead. Rejecting consequentialism, the nonconsequentialist typically
embraces constraints-that there are some kinds of acts that are intrinsically wrong.
Acts of this type should not be done even when doing one would bring about the best
possible outcome. The nonconsequentialist also typically embraces options-that there
are some innocent acts that it is morally permissible to do even though in the particular
circumstances they would not bring about the best possible outcome. See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM
FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (criticizing utilitarianism for its commitment to consequential-

ism); see also

MARCIA

W.

BARON ET AL., THREE METHODS OF ETHICS:

A

DEBATE

(1997)

(debating the merits of consequentialist ethical theory against the rival doctrines of
Kantianism and virtue ethics); Frances Kamm, Towards the Essence of Nonconsequentialism, in ALEX BYRNE, ROBERT STALNAKER, AND RALPH WEDGWOOD, FACT AND VALUE: ESSsAYS
ON ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS FOR JUDITH JARviS THOMSON

(2001).

11. Just war theory traditionally includes the requirement that only morally legitimate political authorities, not individuals, may engage in violence with the intention of
killing one's adversary. On this view, to qualify as just, a war must be initiated and
waged by competent authority, a lawful government. One need not be an anarchist to
regard this requirement as plainly unacceptable. Just military combat could surely occur
in a state of nature, absent any constituted authority. If the scale of such combat were
large, we would be talking about war. Also, if an unjust political authority rules the
land, in favorable circumstances it would be just for individuals banding together informally to rebel against their rulers. If one's country is unjustly invaded, and the extant
government does not mount an effective defense, private individuals may legitimately
wage war against the invaders provided the conditions for just war other than the putative requirement that just war may only be initiated by lawfully constituted authority, are
satisfied. The reasons to reject the putative requirement that a just war combat must be
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The Idea of a Noncombatant

Are individuals who do not threaten violence entitled to immunity
from deliberate attack? The proposed line between combatants and noncombatants locates the moral boundary between people who are, and those
who are not, materially contributing to the war effort.
In her essay, War and Murder, G. E. M. Anscombe perhaps sharpens
the line in a way that narrows the class of permissible targets. Her moral
rule is that one must never attack the innocent, and "[w]hat is required, for
the people attacked to be non-innocent in the relevant sense, is that they
should themselves be engaged in an objectively unjust proceeding which
the attacker has the right to make his concern; or-the commonest caseshould be unjustly attacking him.' 1 2 In this sense, innocence and lack of
innocence are clearly distinct from innocence and culpability: one can be
engaged in an objectively unjust proceeding while being blamelessly ignorant of its unjust character. An individual, therefore, can be morally innocent but not innocent in a sense entitling her to immunity from justified
attack.
There remains a question as to what counts as being an engaged participant in a war effort. Must one be (a) doing something that one believes,
with good reason, will advance the war effort and also (b) doing something
that actually advances it? Or must one also (c) intend to advance the war
effort by one's actions? Or would any one of (a) through (c) by itself be
sufficient? Because (a), (b), and (c) may exist to varying degrees, noncombatant status is a sliding rather than binary classification.
Some scholars narrowly draw the distinction, defining combatants as
individuals "who are engaged in fighting."' 13 Emphasizing the perspective
of a soldier struggling to discern permissible targets in a just war, C. A. J.
Coady suggests that noncombatants are those "prosecuting the harms that
are believed to legitimate resort to responsive violence .... ,,14 This definition implies that individuals who merely provide soldiers with goods
required in the course of ordinary life, rather than what they need to per-

initiated by lawfully constituted authority parallel the reasons to reject the idea that only
a lawful state can genuinely engage in the practice of punishing wrongdoers, and that
private individuals who deliberately impose hard treatment on offenders against the
moral law cannot satisfy the conditions for justified punishment. See generally JOHN
SIMMONS, LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS (1992) discussing this issue in the third chapter of

his book. See also PAUL

RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE: How SHALL MOD-

(1961) for a nuanced history of the theory of justified
revolution; cf. Robert K. Fullinwider, Terrorism, Innocence, and War, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
Q. 9 (2001), which unduly emphasizes the importance of a competent authority in discussing moral issues of contemporary terrorism.
12. G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, War and Murder, in 3 THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF
G.E.M. ANSCOMBE VOLUME III: ETHICS RELIGION AND POLITICS 51, 53 (1981).
13. David Rodin, Terrorism Without Intention, 114 ETHICS 752, 757 (2004).
14. C.AJ. Coady, Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency, 114 ETHICS 772, 774
(2004).
ERN WAR BE CONDUCTED JUSTLY?
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form as soldiers, are noncombatants. 15
Soldiers, of course, are unable to fight without daily nourishment, just
as they are unable to fight without bullets. Those supplying the resources
enabling soldiers to fight materially contribute to the war effort. One
might take the position that the relevant demarcation is a causal notion:
when one's activities, if successful, would significantly increase the
probability that group X's war effort will prevail, one materially contributes
to X's war effort. An individual performing these activities is, therefore, a
combatant for purposes of delimiting the just war immunity. This formulation draws the circle broadly. If a nation is mobilized for an exhaustive
war effort, almost any productive activity may indirectly aid the war effort.
Consider the following hypotheticals. If previously unemployed civilians
join the labor force producing goods for home consumption, other workers
are freed to make supplies for troops, and if some civilians make propaganda films boosting the resolve of the home work force, again production
for military use grows.
A narrow understanding of the idea of the combatant corresponds
with a moral line that could be drawn between ways people assist evildoers
in ordinary life. A restaurant owner who serves a meal to a known bandit
does not materially assist the bandit's crimes, we suppose. A gun dealer
who sells a gun to the same bandit, however, is implicated in the latter's
subsequent crimes, we might think. In short, an individual who provides a
bank robber with what she needs in the ordinary course of life is not
engaged in the enterprise of bank robbing; however, one who supplies the
same bank robber with guns and a map indicating the exact location of a
bank vault is so engaged. Similarly, an individual who supplies soldiers
the means of warfare is engaged in the enterprise of war, while one who
supplies the very same soldiers with food, clothing, and shelter during
peacetime is not.
The common-sense way of drawing these lines, nevertheless, collapses
under scrutiny. There might be a morally relevant distinction between the
intention of the meal provider and the gun provider, but then again, there
might not be. The meal provider might intend to facilitate the bandit's
crimes, while the gun owner might not. The act of the meal provider might
do more than the act of the gun provider to increase the probability that a
crime will be committed, or the amount of wrongful damage done if a
crime is committed, or both. The line between what is needed in the ordinary course of life and what is needed specifically to prosecute the problematic crime or military act does not necessarily correspond to any
significant moral distinction. Of course, the just war theorist is a deontologist who distinguishes between doing and permitting harm, but both the
meal provider and the gun provider are plainly on the doing side of that
line. Each might try to excuse his assistance of the bandit by saying, "If I
15. See Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 123 (1972), reprinted
QUESTIONS 53, 71 (1979) for an affirmation of this understanding of the
distinction between combatant and noncombatant.

inMORTAL
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don't do it, someone else will," which would mean that his activity is not a
"but for" cause of the bandit's crimes. In either case, the particular circumstances might vindicate or defeat the proffered excuse. Consider a case in
which the meal provider and the gun provider are both equally positioned
to know that their particular assistance to the bandit will enable him to
commit a crime. In this case, both are materially assisting a crime and
equally wrong for doing so. The fact that, psychologically, the provision of
a gun has a more vivid and salient connection in our minds to the ultimate
wrongful acts is not, per se, morally relevant.
What holds in ordinary life also holds in war. We should draw the
line broadly, regard as combatants all who materially assist the war, and
acknowledge that status as a combatant is a matter of degree. It should be
noted that I endorse the view that medical personnel who treat wounded
soldiers behind the lines, thereby facilitating their return to battle, materially assist a war effort and hence qualify as combatants. Good consequences may flow from establishing and upholding conventions that
stipulate that medical personnel and farmers supplying aid to the troops
and other indirect providers of aid should be deemed illegitimate targets of
military attack. Considerations of expedience, however, should be sharply
distinguished from the considerations that should figure in a proper development of just warfare theory.
II.

The Moral Shield Protecting Noncombatants

Thus far I have tried to mark the line between combatants and noncombatants. But the combatant/noncombatant distinction does not coincide with the line that divides those who are morally legitimate targets of
violence according to natural law and just war theory, on the one hand,
from those who are not legitimate targets, on the other. So at least I shall
argue. To see this point, it helps to consider self-defense scenarios.
In a just war, some people perpetrate lethal violence against other people in order to advance the just war cause. The question then arises, on
whom may such violence be legitimately perpetrated? By way of example,
take the scenario in which one or a few people, in order to save their own
lives, perpetrate lethal violence against one or a few people in circumstances where such violence qualifies as self-defense. Who are morally
appropriate targets in self-defense scenarios? This self-defense scenario
offers a simple case of violence that many will consider permissible, so the
judgments we make after reflection about self-defense offer some guidance
for how to decide who may be killed in the course of prosecuting a just
war. 16
Consider the fault forfeits first principle. In a situation in which there
is a wrongful threat to an innocent person's life, and only killing another
16. For contrasting views of the ethics of self-defense, compare Judith Thomson, SelfDefense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1991), with Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Justification, and Excuse, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53 (1993), and Michael Otsuka, Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74 (1994).
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person can avert that threat, it is morally better that among those who
might die, a person who is significantly and culpably at fault with respect
to this situation should be the one who dies. The following examples illustrate the principle.
A. Accommodation
You are being chased by a villainous aggressor who is trying to kill you
and will succeed, unless you jump up to a niche where the aggressor cannot follow. There is a bystander standing in this niche who has a perfect
right to be there. The bystander sees that if he accommodates you by moving to the back of the niche, you can jump to it and both of you will be safe.
If the bystander does not move in this way, you could still save yourself, but
only by jumping to the niche and jostling the bystander, causing a fatal fall.
The bystander also sees that this is the case. The bystander declines to
move to the back of the niche.
The example described does not specify the mental state of the niche
occupier, whose failure to accommodate you creates a predicament in
which either you or she must die. Perhaps this bystander believes she is
entitled to remain there and expects you to respect her right even in your
desperate plight. I deny that the bystander plausibly possesses any such
right. On the facts described, she is at least grossly negligent, and hence
significantly and culpably at fault, by virtue of failing to help you by moving to the back of the niche. The "fault forfeits first" principle dictates that
it is morally preferable for the unaccommodating bystander to die rather
than you. To save your life, it is then morally permissible for you to jump
to the niche, causing the bystander to fall. Would you be seriously culpable for causing the death of the bystander? The fault forfeits first principle
responds in the negative: you are entitled to privilege an innocent life over a
culpable one. Acting to produce this morally better state of affairs is not
acting wrongly and does not render you culpably at fault.
B. Guilty Past
Suppose that Smith is an innocent aggressor currently engaged in
attacking you. He is wrongfully trying to inflict lethal violence against you,
but he is not culpable in this respect. Perhaps he is acting on the basis of
false beliefs, and that if these beliefs were true, the attack would be justified. Moreover, he is not culpable for having these false beliefs. The culpable agent here is Jones, who used deception to induce Smith to form these
beliefs. Suppose Jones' evil plan was to trick Smith into killing you. But
now, Jones is no longer doing anything that menaces your life, and we can
suppose there is nothing Jones can do that will now annul his deception
and remove the threat to your life that Smith's aggression represents.
You have a right not to be killed in these circumstances-a right that
Smith is violating. Two courses of action, either one of which would save
your life, are available. You could kill Smith, the innocent aggressor, and
thus prevent him from killing you. Or you could kill Jones, which would
sufficiently unnerve Smith to incapacitate him. Perhaps Smith, positioned
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so that he sees Jones, will witness your act of killing Jones and, as Smith is
very emotionally attached to Jones, Smith will be prevented from acting
effectively, thereby eliminating the threat against your life. These are the
sole life-saving responses available.
Any plausible theory of justifiable homicide would approve killing
Jones to save your life. The pertinent facts are that Jones has contributed to
bringing about the situation in which your life is in peril, Jones is morally
culpable for doing so, and your killing Jones would remove the peril
against your life. Even though Jones is not currently acting in a way that
menaces your life and Smith is, Jones' moral guilt and his causal responsibility for your peril jointly negate his moral immunity from harm. This
claim does not settle the interesting question of whether it would be morally acceptable to kill Smith in self-defense if the option of killing Jones
were not available. The principle of fault forfeits first, applied to this sort
of case, justifies the judgment endorsed above.
The lesson of the self-defense case is readily applicable to the case of
just warfare. Consider a spy working for the Allies in Germany during
World War 1I. It turns out that to fulfill his mission the spy needs to kill
someone. There are two possibly useful homicides, either of which would
contribute equally to the spy's mission. One is to kill a young soldier
raised in a culture that trained young men of ordinary sensibilities not to
question the civil authority. The young soldier believes he is doing the
right thing by serving in the German military. He is not blameworthy for
having this belief, so he is morally not culpable for his soldiering activity.
The other possibility would target a civilian, a noncombatant not engaged
in any war-enabling activity. But this civilian is a fervent Nazi of evil mind.
This noncombatant worked ardently to facilitate Hitler's rise to power and
the consolidation of Nazi rule. I submit that you are morally obligated to
kill the culpable civilian rather than the non-culpable combatant.
The case of a justified military strike against noncombatants, as
described above, involves three factors: (i) the moral culpability of the noncombatant target; (ii) the impact of killing the noncombatant on prosecution of the just war cause; and (iii) the noncombatant's historic
contribution to initiating and sustaining the unjust war effort. 17 Would
the presence of only two of these factors justify attacking noncombatants?
Imagine a potential noncombatant target who culpably endorses the unjust
war effort. The noncombatant is placed so that killing her would advance
the just war effort; however, she neither contributed to the initiation of the
unjust war nor assisted in sustaining it. Again we can consider how we
should respond to analogues of this decision problem that arise in simple
self-defense scenarios.

17. The number of individuals harmed or avoiding harm is also a relevant consideration. It may be permissible, for example, for me to kill several Evil Aggressors to save
my own life. A firm limit, however, may exist on the number of Non-Culpable Aggressors I may kill to avoid my death.
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Guilty Bystander Trying to Inflict Harm

You are driving up a narrow mountain road and see Evil Aggressor
approaching in a large armored vehicle. Evil Aggressor intends to murder
you in a head-on collision. Your only recourse is to drive onto the shoulder
of the road. The shoulder happens to be occupied by an admirer of Evil
Aggressor, Guilty Bystander, who is cheering and gloating at the prospect
of your demise. Let us suppose it is clear that Guilty Bystander just happens to be there, and that he has not deliberately chosen to occupy the site
you now need for your survival. Furthermore, he cannot maneuver to
enable both of you to share the shoulder safely. You must either drive onto
the shoulder, killing Guilty Bystander, or be killed by Evil Aggressor.
Moreover, although the admirer is powerless concretely to threaten your
life, he is doing his best to harm you. He is throwing snowballs to distract
you and hasten your demise. Assume his efforts are entirely futile. Still, we
might think that the combination of wrongfully taking pleasure at your
anticipated demise and acting with evil intent, though entirely impotently,
to facilitate your demise suffices to render this guilty bystander significantly and culpably at fault with respect to your mortal plight. Thus, the
fault forfeits first doctrine would justify driving onto the shoulder, killing
the Guilty Bystander, to save your own life.
D.

Guilty Bystander Disposed to Inflict Harm

We might imagine a variant of this case involving an even more attenuated connection between the bystander's conduct and your injuries. First,
suppose that the case is as described above, except that the Guilty
Bystander is not trying actively to harm you now but is disposed to harm
you right now if he could. I suppose that the fault forfeits first doctrine
also applies here because of Guilty Bystander's evil intent. It is morally
preferable that the guilty bystander dies rather than you and killing Guilty
Bystander to save your own life seems justified. I would add that in both of
the preceding hypotheticals, Guilty Bystander's evil attempt, or evil disposition, would suffice to render the bystander significantly and culpably at
fault in a way that involves forfeiture, in this context, of his right not to be
killed.
E.

Guilty Bystander Exulting in Anticipated Evil

The next case for consideration eliminates the element of wrongful
intent to cause harm. The guilty bystander is merely guilty of possessing a
wrongfully positive attitude toward your imminent demise. He may cheer
the Evil Aggressor, take sadistic satisfaction in contemplating your wrongful death, or exult in the triumph of evil. In this case, the guilty bystander
is purely a bystander. He has no opportunity or intent to cause harm.
Presented with this sort of example, many deontologists would insist that
the bystander has not forfeited his right to be free from harm, and that you,
the innocent driver, are forbidden to harm the bystander, even to save your
life.
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I disagree. I should add that the fault forfeits first principle commits
its proponents to the claim that in a situation in which someone must die,
it is morally better that one who is significantly and culpably at fault with
respect to this situation should die rather than any non-culpable person
who is available to die instead. This holds even when the significantly culpable individual neither causes, threatens, attempts nor is disposed to
cause any concrete harm. At least this is so if you can be seriously at fault
regarding a situation even though your fault involves neither the violation
of anyone's rights nor any wrongful agency aimed at harm. A wrongful
attitude toward the evil that others are perpetrating or threatening can be
sufficient to negate protection. This position, while controversial, strikes
me as correct. Merely taking malicious pleasure in the misfortunes of
others does not establish sufficient culpability to dissolve the shield that
the status of mere bystander confers. But if one varies the case by making
the gloating of the guilty bystander increasingly malign, the judgment that
it is wrong to harm him in order to save the innocent becomes attenuated
and eventually dissipates altogether. 18 (Imagine a person whose life activity entirely revolves around celebratory rehearsal in thought of horrific
immoral acts, such as torture-murder of the innocent.)
F.

Fault Forfeits First Doctrine in Just Warfare

The principle of fault forfeits first carries over to the issue of determining the morally preferred targets of violence in the course of prosecuting a
just war. If one has a sufficiently important moral cause to justify waging
war against the forces opposing that cause, and if killing someone would
also sufficiently advance that cause to justify a killing, it would be morally
preferable to kill a target significantly culpable with respect to the war
rather than an innocent person.
In many cases, one can only advance the just war by killing enemy
combatants, whether or not they are culpable. In many cases, when one
could kill either combatants or noncombatants to advance the just cause,
the combatants will be more culpable, or at least no less culpable, than the
noncombatants. But if one is fighting combatants who are not culpable,
and if the noncombatants are guilty bystanders in any of the ways detailed
above, it will be morally preferable to kill noncombatants rather than combatants to gain a comparative advantage for the just cause.
III.

Noncombatants as Wrongful Trespassers

I have raised the possibility that some noncombatants might not merit
the protection of noncombatant immunity because they are morally culpa18. Jacob Ross posed the following question to me: Why not declare instead that the
morally appropriate target of violence, among all whose death would advance the just
cause, is that individual who has been more culpable over the entire course of his entire
life? See also McMahan, Killing in War supra note 5, at 722. I suppose one would be
rejecting rather than developing deontological ethics if one denied that to be a morally
appropriate target of violence in a situation one must have violated a duty with respect
to that very situation rather than at other times in one's life.
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ble with respect to the unjust war their country is waging. Their past political efforts may have contributed to the current state of affairs, in which
their country is fighting an unjust war. They might be doing everything
possible to aid this evil enterprise, even if this amounts to scarcely anything. Or they might be firmly disposed to contribute to their country's
unjust war effort if they could. At the limit, they might be culpable for
endorsing the unjust war effort and celebrating its triumphs.
There are other possible ways in which noncombatants might plausibly be viewed as legitimate objects of a just war attack. They might, for
example, be enjoying the fruits of a wrongful conquest. Specifically, they
might be using resources and inhabiting land to which they have no right.
For example, if someone wrongly invades and establishes camp in your
home, you may expel her. It would be wrong to use, or threaten the use of,
force beyond what was necessary to remove the unjust occupier, but on
some moral views, the use of violence, even lethal violence, is not forbidden
when necessary to regain possession of significant goods to which one has
a clear moral title. If all else fails, one might say to the invader, whom one
is unable physically to remove, "Get out of my home or I'll shoot!" This
case, as so far described, does not specify whether the continued presence
of the wrongful trespasser would present a slight irritation, a major nuisance, or a serious threat. If the trespass generates only irritation or nuisance, I assert it must be borne if one has no effective means to eliminate it
without subjecting the wrongful trespasser to serious harm. Suppose, however, that the sole method to expel the recalcitrant trespasser without risking personal injury is to use lethal violence. If the trespass itself causes
serious harm, many moral theorists would permit the victim to issue, and
if necessary execute, threats of violence, in order to end the trespass.
The occupation of a country by a foreign conqueror or colonial power
provides a parallel example of unjust trespass. In such a situation, the original inhabitants may have a legitimate grievance against civilian occupants,
who are wrongly squatting on their land. Here, peaceful removal of the
occupants would obviously be morally preferable, though not necessarily
achievable. 19 But violent removal of unjust trespassers is not in principle
ruled out.
IV.

The Noncombatant Status of Captured Soldiers

Another aspect of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, as usually drawn within contemporary just war theory, is initially
attractive but ultimately proves problematic. This is the claim of a moral
symmetry among combatants fighting on the just and unjust sides of a
war. Both sets of combatants do no wrong in shooting at their adversaries,
19. My abstract remarks do not imply moral judgments about particular military
struggles against wrongful occupiers. That judgment must await a case-by-case analysis
of the specific facts. I do not suggest, for example, that the IRA had a moral right to
attack civilians in Northern Ireland, or that Palestinians presently have a moral right to
attack Israeli civilians. See generally Saul Smilansky, Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion, 114 ETHICS 790, 792 (2004).
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and both are equally bound to abide by constraints against harming civilians. Presuming a moral symmetry among all combatants, regardless of
whether they fight for the country promoting or opposing the just war, has
superficial appeal. It collapses, nonetheless, under close scrutiny. When
two or more military forces engage in armed conflict, no more than one of
the opposed forces will have a moral justification for engaging in the conflict. If one side has right on its side, it should not be opposed. Determining which side has the just cause requires, of course, careful weighing of
multiple considerations. A single moral reason favoring a belligerent's war
aims, for example, may be insufficient to establish that a belligerent is
fighting for a just cause. In some conflicts, all the opposing parties have
unjust war aims.
Now consider the soldiers fighting for an unjust cause. These soldiers
should be regarded as individuals engaged in crimes. As a bank robber has
no right to use violence to commit a crime, even when necessary for his
self-defense, soldiers fighting to achieve an unjust goal are likewise forbidden to use violence.
The major objection to this conclusion is that, unlike a bank robber, a
soldier is an agent of the state, and his professional role mediates his moral
responsibilities. Therefore, he should be less culpable, or not culpabe at all,
20
when his performance of his formal duties violates the rights of others.
One may be morally justified in becoming a state official or agent of the
state, and when this is so, one acquires a nontrivial moral obligation to
subordinate one's personal judgment of right and wrong by carrying out
what one is ordered to do, up to some limit of moral heinousness. Consider a prison guard who, in the course of fulfilling his professional duties,
shoots an escaping prisoner. Assume the guard correctly and reasonably
believes that the prisoner has been denied a fair trial and is innocent of the
charges against her. The escaping convict ought not to be shot, but arguably the prison guard ought to fulfill her occupational duty and shoot, and
the guard would not be guilty for doing so. The soldier ordered to kill
enemy combatants whom she reasonably believes are engaged in a just
cause is, morally speaking, in the position of the prison guard.
The response to this objection is that if an institution is generally just,
the efficient functioning of the institution contributes to the just causes the
institution serves. Those regulated by the institution have an obligation to
assist in its efficient functioning, and those who accept an official role in
the institution acquire an even stronger obligation to contribute to its efficient functioning by obeying the chain of command. Minor injustices
resulting from obeying the chain of command should be tolerated. But a
sensible deontological theory would surely hold that there are moral constraints on the pursuit of institutional efficiency, and the substantial moral
rights of those affected by the institution set such constraints. As for the
20. 1 owe the argument in this paragraph, and the prison guard example, to an anonymous referee. See also Noam Zohar, Collective War and IndividualisticEthics: Against the
Conscription of "Self-Defense", 21 POL. THEORY 606 (1993).
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hypothetical escapee situation, I do not believe that it is morally permissible to shoot an innocent escaped convict, even assuming that the unjustly
convicted person should accept his sentence and not attempt to evade it.
The interest in institutional efficiency cannot justify violating the substantial moral rights of individuals. A consequentialist might argue that
upholding the generally just institution, even when its operation occasionally produces serious injustice, maximally protects rights over the longterm. This line of argument, however, is unavailable to the deontologist:
just war theory is premised on a deontological philosophy with robust
agent-relative moral rights
- a philosophy incompatible with such conse1
quentialist arguments.

2

So if the soldier ordered to fight for an unjust cause is in a situation
morally analogous to that of the prison guard in the above example, my
view is that the soldier, like the prison guard, should refrain from shooting.
I recognize that this analogy may be flawed. In a generally just society, a
wrongly convicted individual may well have an obligation to accept the prescribed punishment. If so, the escaping innocent convict is not actually
innocent-he may be culpable for attempting to escape. The obligations of
a soldier ordered to fight on behalf of an unjust cause (and against those
pursuing a just cause) may, therefore, differ from those of a prison guard
confronting a culpable escaping convict (who is innocent of the crime for
which he is in prison, but still wrongfully fleeing). The soldier confronts
enemy combatants who are morally entitled to use violence. Engaged in a
just cause, these enemy combatants are not culpable in any way. Accordingly, there may be grounds for the prison guard to shoot that would not
carry over to the soldier fighting an unjust war.
Some have claimed that if an unjust warrior is not culpable, she will
generally retain the right to fight in self-defense against enemy troops that
have right on their side. 2 2 In most circumstances of war, however, fighting
in self-defense on the part of unjust warriors is likely to advance their
unjust cause. If these morally bad effects of advancing an unjust cause are
significant, as they will be when the stakes are high as in the case in most
wars, any putative right of self-defense on the part of morally innocent
unjust warriors would dissolve. 23 In any event, acts of self-defense by the
morally innocent unjust warrior might be wholly or partially excused but
never justified. Compare the morally innocent bank robber who is
21. Moral obligations are traditionally conceived as agent-relative. Individuals owe
an obligation to each and every rights holder. This duty, therefore, demands more than
merely minimizing the overall incidence of rights violations. See generally ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (arguing against a "utilitarianism of
rights").
22. See McMahan, Killing in War, supra note 5, at 205-6; see also Paul W. Kahn, The
Paradox of Riskless Warfare, 22 PHIL. & PUB. POL. Q. 2 (2002).

23. It is tricky to extrapolate from the principles governing self-defense in ordinary
life an ethics applicable to self-preservation in war. In a confrontation between a morally innocent attacker and a target who appropriately defends himself against such an
assault, either party's success will result in at least one innocent life saved. The outcome
is not nearly as rosy in an unjust war: victory by a morally innocent attacker fighting for
an unjust cause can trigger moral catastrophe.
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attacked by police and kills them, as this robber thinks, in self-defense.
This is excusable killing on the part of the bank robber but not justified
self-defense.
Just war doctrine in its contemporary manifestations tends to distinguish the moral responsibility of soldiers to fight only according to the
norms of just warfare from the responsibility of soldiers to fight only in
just wars. Just warfare doctrine also tends to attenuate or deny the latter.
Walzer comments, "by and large we don't blame a soldier, even a general,
who fights for his own government. '24 Hence, a soldier who fights fairly,
even in an unjust war, is not guilty of any moral crime, and if he surrenders
or is captured, he acquires immunity status, much like the noncombatant.
It is a violation of the war convention deliberately to harm or kill prisoners
of war, even if doing so would help advance the just cause. The argument
for the limited moral responsibility of soldiers for their participation in an
unjust war goes as follows:
1. Engaging in war when one's cause is unjust is doing what is morally wrong;
2. Doing what is morally wrong under pressure of coercion or compulsion tends to excuse (rendering one less blameworthy or not
blameworthy at all);
3. Doing what is wrong as a result of excusable ignorance tends to
excuse (rendering one less blameworthy or not blameworthy at
all);
4. A soldier's engaging in war when his cause is unjust is always
done under pressure of coercion or compulsion and as a result of
excusable ignorance;
5. A soldier's engaging in war when his cause is unjust is always
done under two conditions that tend to excuse;
6. These two conditions, alone or together, always suffice to render a
soldier's engaging in war when his cause is unjust entirely excusable and not blameworthy;
7. If what one does is entirely unblameworthy, one should not be
blamed;
8. A soldier who engages in war when his cause is unjust should
never be blamed for doing so.
To be sure, acting under coercion, compulsion, or as a result of excusable ignorance may minimize blameworthiness; however, it is implausible to
presume that soldiers fighting for an unjust cause are necessarily blameless. Indeed, coercion, compulsion and excusable ignorance are not inevitable aspects of fighting in an unjust war. Even when these are present,
they may not exist to a degree that entirely excuses the soldier.
Sometimes the political rulers who command the agent to go to war
are not in fact threatening serious penalties if the agent declines to obey the
command. Coercion or compulsion may not always be present to any significant extent. Moreover, in ordinary life, only severe coercion or compul24. Walzer, supra note 2, at 39.
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sion completely excuse wrongdoing. If a bad man threatens to kill me
unless I kill two innocent people, and I kill two innocent people, what I do
is wrong, and probably blameworthy. If the bad man threatens just to
break my knees, and to avoid this penalty I kill two innocent people, I am
certainly blameworthy.
Much the same may be true of excusable ignorance. Sometimes political rulers say, "Go fight for the nation! Our cause is just!" But most people
would know, or should know, that rulers often make spurious or inflated
claims. Sometimes political rulers announcing the call to war do not even
try to present the conflict as morally justified. They say, "Our glorious
army will crush its puny enemies. We are strong and they are weak." The
fact that the political rulers mobilizing troops for war do not offer any
moral justification for going to war ought to establish in the mind of a
reasonable person a strong presumption that the war lacks justification. In
such cases, ignorance of the injustice of the war would be inexcusable.
In a liberal democracy with open media, citizens have both the opportunity and the responsibility to learn the relevant facts and thus decide
whether the nation's engagement in any wars they are asked to support and
fight is just or unjust. If citizens fail to make use of these opportunities,
and go to war falsely thinking their nation's cause is just, their ignorance
may make them culpable. Naturally, there may be a stark asymmetry here
between the degree of responsibility fairly attributable to citizens who are
recruited to serve in an unjust war in a democracy and citizens recruited in
a tyrannical regime, which severely restricts free speech and related civil
liberties.
Morality surely prescribes a strong generic presumption against killing people. Powerful reasons are needed to overcome this presumption. If
my wife says to me, "Kill the neighbors!", even though she is a reasonable
person who usually speaks the truth, I must surely demand a much more
complete account of the moral grounds for this killing. Additionally, I
must check the facts and assess the argument for myself before I could
possibly be justified in killing the neighbors. This presumption equally
applies to killing in war. Moreover, one might well conclude from the historical record that most wars are unjust on all sides; therefore, there should
not be a general presumption that when a political ruler says, "Our cause is
just and our war effort is moral and right," she is speaking the truth.
Wars cause immense harm to humanity. One should not engage in
war unless one has compelling moral reasons for doing so. A subjective
belief in the justice of a cause is insufficient to excuse an objectively wrong
war. Sometimes, those fighting in an unjust war are acting under either
coercion or excusable ignorance, or both, and these conditions tend to
excuse. But these excuses are not always present and will exist to varying
degrees. Within just war theory, there is no good reason to hold that those
who engage in unjust war are seldom or never blameworthy. It may be
expedient to presume otherwise, but expediency should not shape just war
theory assessments.
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The moral responsibility of individuals who engage in unjust war
diminishes the significance of the distinction between combatants and
noncombatants. 25 First, those who engage in unjust war are acting
wrongly and without justification. Therefore, they may be acting culpably
when they fire at enemy combatants. When fighting an unjust war, one
perpetrates unjustified killings whether one shoots at combatants or noncombatants. If an unjust warrior has a choice of killing either two enemy
noncombatants or a single enemy combatant, it is preferable to do the latter. Since both types of killings are wrong, it is morally preferable to kill
the smaller number, other things being equal. Second, the fact that those
fighting an unjust war are engaged in wrongdoing undermines the moral
presumption that, if captured, they become noncombatants possessing the
same right not to be killed as any other noncombatants. Suppose that
soldiers fighting an unjust war are captured, and keeping them alive significantly hinders the just war effort. This may be because there is a large risk
that if they are not killed they will escape and rejoin the army or it may be
because tending to them diverts resources needed to win a crucial battle.
To focus the issue, suppose that soldiers engaged in a just war can either
fight and kill one hundred active enemy soldiers or slaughter one hundred
captured enemy soldiers. Engaging in battle would be justified (the
expected gain is worth the expected cost), but slaughtering the captured
soldiers would achieve the same gain at less cost and therefore would more
efficiently advance the just war effort. On these premises, the captured
soldiers are not threatening, but bringing about their deaths would nevertheless be useful. The more it is the case that those engaged in the just war
effort reasonably believe that the enemy soldiers lack an excuse for engaging in unjust war, the less plausible, I submit, a moral distinction between
the active enemy and the captured enemy becomes. Under these circumstances, killing captured enemies also becomes more tolerable. The same
argument supports trying captured enemies who are simply culpable combatants for war crimes. In principle such combatants could be guilty as
charged and disqualified from the just war privileges of captured soldiers.
V.

Guerrilla Combat

Guerrilla warfare takes many forms, but a common method involves
irregular combatants who do not wear soldier uniforms when they engage
in an ambush, and who take on the appearance of civilian noncombatants
at other times. In so doing, fighters exploit the distinction between combatant and noncombatant and the reluctance of enemy soldiers to fire on
noncombatants. The guerilla hides among civilians and presents enemy
soldiers with a dilemma: attack locations with suspected guerrillas, inadvertently harming civilian noncombatants, or refrain from attack. Something of the same dilemma is present when enemy soldiers position
themselves close to civilians so that their adversaries must either refrain
25. See generally McMahan, supra note 5.
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from attacking them or inflict significant injuries on civilian noncombatant targets.
Traditional just war theory affords combatant adversaries a presumptive right to engage in fighting. Perhaps both sides should assume that
even if their enemies are fighting for an unjust cause, they cannot be
expected to know this is so. Additionally, according to this tradition, the
distinction between combatant and noncombatant assumes its usual significance. Then both sides are obligated to fight in ways that do not compromise the ability of the opposing forces to distinguish combatants and
civilian noncombatants and, when firing, to aim their fire solely at the
legitimate combatant targets. Some theorists assert that if military personnel hide among civilians or shelter themselves among noncombatant persons and buildings, the moral responsibility for harm to civilian targets
falls on those who hide and shelter, not on the enemy soldiers who then
cannot carry on the fight except by attacking these presumptively illegitimate targets.
The position that I am arguing for downplays the moral significance of
the combatant versus noncombatant distinction. Therefore, the moral
wrong of abusing or exploiting that distinction will be less on my account
than on traditional accounts. 26 Consider the generic situation in which
enemy forces occupy a country and some of the inhabitants resort to guerilla combat to resist this occupation. They do so to compensate for conventional force inferiority. Now the guerrillas either have just cause to
resist the occupiers or they do not. It is suggested below that if they do not,
the occupation itself is just. This is a simplification, since cases could
arise in which the occupation is unjust but resistance would also be unjust.
If the guerrillas have a just cause, they have a right to shoot at the
invaders, and the invaders have no right to return fire. The invaders have
no right either to pursue the guerrillas into the villages or to shoot at anyone. They may not fire on civilian noncombatants, avowed combatants, or
combatants masquerading as civilians in order to perpetuate the unjust
occupation. In this scenario, one could suppose that the guerrillas are
wrong to hide among civilians or pretend to be civilians between episodes
of combat because they make it more difficult for unjust occupiers who
conscientiously wish to abide by the war convention to fight them successfully. However, I do not see why the guerrillas fighting in a just cause owe
invaders an opportunity to attack them successfully.
If the guerrilla cause is just, and their tactics effectively advance the
cause, I suppose the civilians are morally obligated to support the guerrillas' struggle and to shoulder some risk on their behalf. At a minimum,
actions by guerillas imperiling civilians do not cease to be just unless the
expected harm to civilians is disproportionate to the anticipated benefits.
Moreover, if the guerrillas' cause is just, civilians share an affirmative obli26. What I go on to say about guerrilla warfare should generate a parallel revision in
our understanding of the morality of sieges, blockades, and reprisals. See WALZER, supra
note 2, chs. 10, 11, and 13.
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gation to provide shelter, basic provisions and other aid. At the same time,
they have a duty not to disclose to the unjust occupiers the location or
identity of guerilla combatants.
On the other hand, suppose that the occupation of the country is just,
and the resistance of the guerrillas is unjust. Now, the guerrillas have no
right either to shoot at the occupiers or to imperil civilians by hiding or
sheltering among them. The civilians have the right to go about their lives
peacefully, without being drawn into an armed struggle. 27 The just
occupiers have a duty to refrain from firing at peaceable civilians drawn
into the line of fire against their will. Innocent civilians and the just
occupiers share a moral responsibility to avoid unduly endangering genuinely innocent bystanders. This responsibility might generate a duty on
the part of innocent bystanders to withdraw from areas where guerrillas
are located, so that the just occupiers can attack the guerrillas without
harming civilians. In some circumstances, if the guerrillas in one's neighborhood are sufficiently weak militarily, one may be obligated, as a peaceable civilian, to drive the guerillas away from areas where civilians are
present. They may also be obligated to provide information to the just
occupiers on the identity of suspected guerillas hiding among them. If
civilians support an unjust guerrilla warfare effort, they may be culpable
for doing so, and culpability may erode the moral shield of traditional noncombatant immunity.
In the case of just war against a guerrilla insurgency, the distinction
between the combatant who is the legitimate target of military attack and
the noncombatant who is not a legitimate target does not disappear
entirely from the just warfare account. But the issue of just war (who has a
just cause to fight?) profoundly shapes the obligations of just warfare
(whom is it permissible deliberately to attack?) and the line between combatant and noncombatant does not have the make-or-break significance
that it does in traditional just warfare doctrine.
VI.

Morally Innocent Unjust Combatants

My claim is that whether or not one is morally insulated from deliberate attack during war depends more on the justice or injustice of the aims
for which one wages war than on one's status as combatant or noncombatant. Roughly, if one is fighting for a just cause, one may fire on those
materially aiding the enemy's war effort, including those culpable agents
who have acted in the past to bring into existence an unjust menace (or
those who are disposed to do so if they could), and perhaps also those who
endorse the unjust war effort, provided the endorsements rise to the level
27. The statement in the text is not quite right in all circumstances. A bystander
caught in the cross-fire between just and unjust combatants has a moral duty to accommodate and facilitate the just combat effort at least by removing herself from the line of
fire. See Robert Nozick, Total War, Nuclear Deterrence Terrorism, Reprisals - Drawing
Some Moral Lines, REAsoN, Dec. 1978 at 19 reprinted in ROBERT NOZICK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES 300, 303 (1997), retitled War, Terrorism, Reprisals - Drawing Some Moral Lines.
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of serious culpability. This claim may be vulnerable to challenge. 28 The
challenge further presses the logic of the claim that moral culpability, or
lack thereof, plays a greater role in determining the limits of permissible
attack than accounts of the war convention by traditionally-minded theorists such as Walzer and Ramsey wish to allow.
Consider the position adopted by the War Convention. Suppose you
are engaged in a just war. You would have a moral right deliberately to
attack morally culpable combatants fighting for an unjust cause, and perhaps deliberately to attack morally culpable noncombatants as well. What
should be said about your supposed right deliberately to attack morally
innocent combatants who are fighting on the side of injustice? The war
convention constrains what it is permissible to do when fighting for a just
cause. Just as one may not permissibly fire on morally innocent bystanders, even if doing so would advance the just war effort, a similar constraint
may bar an individual from advancing a just cause by attacking morally
innocent combatants.
Several considerations shape the ultimate morality of attacking certain
individuals to advance a just war. Compare, as potential targets of attack,
the morally innocent unjust warrior and the plainly innocent noncombatant, i.e., the true bystander. The former is at the least performing actions
that are objectively morally wrong, except in very unusual circumstances. 29 This will be so even if an individual is hypnotized or so brainwashed that she is not morally responsible for her behavior, not fully an
agent on this occasion but only an unjust threat. In many circumstances,
the innocent unjust warrior will be acting as a morally responsible agent in
performing combatant activities. This unjust soldier decides what to do on
the basis of the information and reasons available to her, and she is morally responsible for her choices, even if they are ultimately excusable. Such
an agent is the paradigmatic innocent wrongdoer. Both the doing of what
is objectively wrong and the doing of what is objectively wrong as a responsible agent, though excused and not culpable, distinguish the morally innocent unjust warrior from the true bystander. These two distinctions
ground the moral permission to attack the former but not the latter, even
though warriors and bystanders are equally non-culpable.
This last claim is compatible with holding that there is some moral bar
on attacking morally innocent unjust warriors. Their innocence is a moral
28. See McMahan, Killing in War, supra note 5, at 209-21. See also McMahan, SelfDefense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker, 104 ETHics 252 (1994) exploring these
self-defense issues and raising objections against the position that it is morally permissible to kill morally innocent attackers, but not committing firmly to any particular resolution of the issue.
29. 1 am imagining coerced participation in combat, which would not only excuse
but also justify participation in war. Suppose, for example, that the evil dictator threatens to murder each of the 100 children in your province unless you join his unjust war
as an enlisted soldier. You now face a choice of evils, and even if there is a strong
deontological obligation not to violate people's rights by engaging in unjust war, the
rights at stake might be outweighed by the evil that would fall on the children if you
refrain from engaging in this rights violation yourself.
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reason, though not necessarily a decisive reason, for refraining from violence against them. It is impermissible to use military violence to advance
a just cause in certain situations. The evil of attacking innocents, even
innocents fighting for an unjust cause, may outweigh the moral gain that
would accrue from advancing the just cause by such attack. A particularly
important just cause, however, may override the bar on attacking morally
innocent unjust warriors.
A third relevant factor that is often, though not always, present is that
the advantage to the just cause that would be gained by attacking combatants fighting for an unjust cause is often far greater than that gained by
attacking noncombatants. Noncombatants are often easy and tempting
targets, but their destruction tends only marginally to advance the just
cause. In contrast, to block the success of an unjust cause being advanced
by a military operation, one must usually defeat the military forces arrayed
under the banner of the unjust cause.
A fourth relevant factor, briefly described above, is the magnitude of
the moral stakes in the combat. Proponents of a just cause that has significant moral value will have substantial license to attack enemy combatants.
Personal culpability will weaken one's right to be free from deliberate
attack. This is because it is better to attack culpable rather than non-culpable combatants, all other things being equal. It is similarly preferable to
attack culpable rather than non-culpable noncombatants. The fault forfeits
first doctrine asserts that it is better to attack the culpable rather than the
non-culpable, but it does not, per se, rule out attacking non-culpable
inviduals if there are no culpable targets whose destruction or incapacitation would advance the just cause.
The morally innocent unjust warrior is engaged in conduct that is
objectively morally wrong. His side's victory produces serious injustice.
Even if the just warrior and the unjust warrior are equally innocent, the
fact that the former fights to achieve good, while the latter opposes it, is
morally significant. I conclude that it is permissible for the just warrior to
attack the morally innocent unjust adversary. Furthermore, it is at best
excusable, but certainly never justified, for the morally innocent unjust
30
adversary to fight for her side.
Consider the hypothetical scenario in which the warriors fighting for
the just cause are morally guilty-they have every reason to believe they are
30. See McMahan, Killing in War, supra note 5, at 722-25; see also Otsuka, supra note
16, at 74-94. Otsuka suggests that the circumstance in which a morally innocent,
unjust attacker intends to carry out an attack that is, in fact, wrong can generate a moral
permission to use lethal violence against such an attacker. But a morally innocent person who becomes a lethal threat without any exercise of her own agency is assimilated
to the class of innocent bystanders, who may not be harmed even to save one's own life
from wrongful attack. This position is consistent with the further claim that the right to
attack innocent attackers is sharply limited. Whereas one is allowed to kill in selfdefense any number of evil aggressors who are menacing one's life, one might insist that
when self-defensive attack against morally innocent attackers causes more deaths of
innocent people, or equivalent evils, than it prevents, the right to such self-defensive
violence fades away. In just wars this condition is often satisfied.
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fighting for the wrong-and the unjust warriors opposing them are morally
innocent-they have every reason to believe their cause is just. I maintain
that the warriors fighting for the just cause do what is right, even if they are
blameworthy for doing so. Furthermore, those fighting against them are
doing what is wrong, even though their actions may be morally meritorious. In the unusual circumstance that killing warriors on either side
would equally advance the just cause, 3 1 it would be preferable for the morally innocent unjust warriors to live and for the morally guilty just warriors
to die. So I contend that in this odd circumstance it is morally permissible,
or even morally required, to kill one's blameworthy comrades in a just war
enterprise rather than morally innocent enemy combatants fighting for an
unjust cause.
Culpability, though a significant consideration, does not trump all
other factors. It may be morally permissible for those fighting a just war to
deliberately fire on morally innocent combatants fighting for the unjust
32
cause.
VII.

Should Rights Reflect What We Can Know?

Against my claims that (1) it is sometimes morally preferable to attack
guilty noncombatants rather than innocent combatants, and that (2) sometimes the combatants are morally guilty of the crime of war and, when this
is so, surrendering or being captured does entitle them to noncombatant
immunity, it might be urged that these are merely logical possibilities with
no practical relevance. Just war theory should provide sensible advice readily adaptable to real world scenarios. In actual circumstances, we never
know whether civilians on the enemy side are morally culpable, so what we
might permissibly do to them if we had this knowledge is not an issue to
which just war theory should pay any attention. Additionally, we can
rarely apprehend whether enemy soldiers subjectively and reasonably
believe their cause is just. Given these limitations, individual culpability
should be excluded from the set of considerations informing legitimate
targets of attack. So runs the objection against 1 and 2.
I respond that just war theory should proceed in stages. The first
stage should clarify what is morally permissible and impermissible in
given circumstances, with the simplifying assumption that all parties possess the relevant knowledge regarding their choice of conduct. Next, we
should consider what morality requires when this assumption of full
knowledge is weakened in various ways. When people act wrongly based
31. What sort of case could this be? Consider James Thurber's imaginary civil war
history, If General Grant had been Drinking at Appomattox, which appeared in the New
Yorker on December 6, 1930, and recounts what would have happened if General Grant
had been drinking at Appomattox. Given that the generals who carry out the surrender
procedure would be hopelessly confused, winning the battles could have meant losing
the war.
32. See Larry Alexander, Justificationand Innocent Aggressors, 33 WAYNE LAW REViEW
1177 (1987) for the argument that self-defense against innocent attackers is, at most,
excusable but never justified.
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on ignorance of facts or norms, their ignorance may or may not be blameworthy. Innocent ignorance excuses and may fully exonerate certain acts.
None of this has any tendency to show that moral guilt and innocence
have no significant influence on the just conduct of war. The more egregiously immoral the war aims of belligerents, the less likely it is that the
citizens of the belligerent nation, who endorse the aims of the war, are
guiltless in doing so. The more democratic and open the society, and the
more educated the citizens in the society waging unjust war, the more
likely it is that they had the opportunity to form a sound judgment of the
morality of the conflict and are, therefore, culpable if they neglected or
misused this opportunity. One may lack detailed evidence about individuals in an enemy nation, but have a reasonable basis for approximate statistical judgments. One may conclude without specific evidence on each
individual that many citizens of Stuttgart in 1944 supported Hitler and
that many of them were blameworthy for doing so. There simply is no
basis for pleading that we can never have sufficient information to form
reasonable beliefs about opponents' degree of complicity and moral guilt.
Consider the position of the German citizens who pleaded "we're not
guilty" when challenged by the army prosecutor in the 1961 movie Judgment at Nuremberg. Their claim was not that the facts were too murky to
sustain a judgment. Rather, they insisted that the demonstrable facts exonerated them (and that this judgment can be sensibly formed without a
criminal trial or similar elaborate investigation). Their particular claim
might be dubious, but I endorse the general claim that an observer can
often reasonably surmise whether individuals were complicit in wartime
evils.
I should explicitly state that, on my view, the fact that considerations
of culpability affect what harms one may permissibly impose on persons
does not erase the distinction between permissibly imposing harm on a
person and punishing that person for wrongdoing. For all that I have said,
it may be that the coercive imposition of serious punishment on persons
should be carried out only by an authorized government agency and
according to a finding of criminal wrongdoing by a trial or some other
form of due process. Nonetheless, if my life is threatened, whether I may
permissibly kill other persons to save my own life depends on their culpability with respect to the present threat. If in the heat of action I have no
way of assessing likely culpability, the culpability factor drops out of consideration. But in many situations, participants in war and observers of
military conflicts can roughly estimate likely culpability, and this estimation will define permissible responses.
In this connection it is important to guard against a tempting confusion of thought. Nothing I have affirmed in this esay rules out the possibility that, enforcing both traditional noncombatant immunity and the
presumption that combatants are innocent of the crime of war, even if their
cause is unjust, produces morally desirable consequences over the longterm. Attacking civilians in the course of war tends to generate hatred of
the enemy on both sides and to inhibit the conditions of a just and lasting
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peace, no matter what the outcome of the conflict. Holding soldiers
responsible for the justice or injustice of their cause tends to encourage
their belief that they should fight to the bitter end, even in a lost cause,
because they cannot surrender without exposing themselves to the risk of
severe punishment. These considerations of expediency should be distinguished from considerations internal to the morality of just warfare, the
deontological theory that supposes some courses of action are right or
wrong, quite independently of their tendency to produce best outcomes.
My aim here is to press the internal logic of just war theory.
VIII.

Absolute and Moderate Construction of the Revised Right of
Immunity from Deliberate Attack

To this point I have been discussing where exactly to draw the line
between those who may legitimately be attacked in war and those who may
not be attacked. Even if all my arguments to this point are successful, they
do not entirely reject the fundamental moral idea of noncombatant immunity. In war, as in peacetime, some persons have a right not to be killed,
which includes a right not to be deliberately attacked. 3 3 Consider the following unambiguous case. The just warriors are confronting evil aggressors, and they are tempted, by reasons of military expediency, to turn their
weapons on innocent civilians who are merely non-guilty bystanders to the
conflict. Just warfare principles applied to this case do not yield the judgment that these innocent bystanders have an absolute right not to be
harmed. This is because it may be that a morally permissible attack on
legitimate military targets may have the foreseen or unforeseen, but, in any
event, unintended result of killing some innocent bystanders. Provided
that the proportionality constraint is satisfied, such attacks may be morally
acceptable. The innocent bystanders, nevertheless, retain a crucial moral
right not to be deliberately attacked. That is, others may not seek to harm
them as a means to an end or as an end in itself.
The next question remains whether the innocent bystander civilian's
moral right to be spared from an attack is a right that holds without any
exceptions. A right is absolute if and only if one is bound to respect it,
regardless of the consequences. Is the right of noncombatant immunity as
defined by the War Convention absolute in this sense? Is infringing this
33. This formulation carries a commitment to a controversial proposition in traditional just war theory, which is not at issue in this essay. The proposition is this: the
right of noncombatant immunity is the right not to be deliberately attacked, and is not
violated by one who directs fire only at combatants (or a legitimate military target)
while knowing but not intending that harm to noncombatants will result, provided the
unintended harm is not disproportionate to the good effect at which one does aim. I
have no quarrel with this aspect of traditional just war theory, which incorporates the
doctrine of double effect. See Frances Kamm, Failuresof Just War Theory: Terror, Harm,
and Justice, 114 ETHICS 650 (2004) for criticism of the doctrine with emphasis on its
implications for morally permissible ways of waging war; see also Francis Kamm,
Towards the Essence of Nonconsequentialism, in FACT AND VALUE: ESSAYS ON ETHICS AND

METAPHYSICS FOR JUDITH JARIis THOMSON 155 (Alex Byrne et al. eds., 2001) for development of a deontological moral position that eschews the doctrine of double effect.
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right always morally wrong or merely sometimes? We might limit the term
"terrorism" to deliberate violations of the War Convention. The terrorist
then is one who engages in an attack intending to harm morally innocent
civilian bystanders. Alternatively, the terrorist might engage in an attack
that inadvertently rather than intentionally harms such bystanders. This
harm, nevertheless, may be sufficiently great to suggest that the terrorist is
unconcerned with bystander casualties. Might military actions that fit
these descriptions ever be morally justified, all things considered?
The absolutist holds that certain moral rights should be respected,
even if the heavens would fall. This view is initially appealing, but if the
consequences of protecting these rights were truly catastrophic, most
would agree that those rights must yield. Michael Walzer, who wrestles
with this issue, prescribes narrow exceptions to this absolutist rule according to a specific formula. 3 4 He proposes, in effect, that justice should
always be done, unless the "heavens" are really about to fall. For him, if a
supreme emergency arises, the right of noncombatant immunity gives way,
and it is morally acceptable to attack innocent bystanders.
Walzer finds in the policy of terror bombing as carried out by the
Allies fighting against Hitler's armies in the darkest days of World War II a
compelling instance of supreme emergency. He contends that the bombing raids directed at residential districts of German cities in 1940 and 1941
were clear violations of noncombatant immunity but, nevertheless, morally
justified. 35 The supreme emergency doctrine commands rigid respect for
the right of noncombatant immunity, unless doing so would produce
moral catastrophe. The annihilation of a national community or some
morally equivalent disaster would qualify as consequences so horrible that
if one can only prevent them by violating noncombatant immunity, one
morally ought to do so. In a supreme emergency, otherwise wrongful violations of the right of civilian bystanders not to be deliberately attacked are
justifiable, provided they are necessary to prevent the threatened catastrophe from coming about and provided proportionality is satisfied.
One possible response to Walzer's characterization of Allied terror
bombing would be to deny that the actual policy necessarily violated the
war convention, 36 but I will set this issue to the side. Assume that this
34. See WALZER, supra note 2, chs. 12, 16, and 17.

35. This hypothetical does not necessarily represent the actual history of the war.
Military historian John Keegan writes that only in 1942 did the British military conduct
regular bombing raids on residential neighborhoods rather than military and industrial
facilities. See JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 374 (1993). If Keegan is correct,

then British terror bombings were not responses to a supreme emergency and thus could
not conform to Walzer's rules. Walzer might respond that given the limits on the technology of targeting in 1940 and 1941, the idea of aiming at a target smaller than a large
area were fatuous, so one could not credibly claim to be intending to hit a factory and
not the surrounding neighborhoods. If so, a supreme emergency may well have existed
in 1940 and 1941.
36. The argument would be that if one is entitled to attack factory workers, because
they qualify as combatants, one is entitled to attack them in their homes and, if one does
so, the deaths of noncombatant family members, if any, would be merely foreseen and
not intended. So by the doctrine of double effect, the killings of the noncombatant
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strategy violated the War Convention and was necessary to avoid the
destruction of a national community. Is Walzer's supreme emergency doctrine coherent and plausible? Should supreme emergency become a principle of just war theory?
I am sympathetic to Walzer's attempt to jettison absolutism without
either abandoning the right of noncombatant immunity entirely or qualifying it to such an extreme that it hardly retains any content. 3 7 Nonetheless
Walzer's position is inherently unstable and ultimately unacceptable. The
problem lies close to the surface of Walzer's discussion. Walzer stipulates
that the right of noncombatant immunity must only yield when the aggregate evil avoided approaches moral catastrophe. This argument is faulty:
the basic logic of this position supports killing innocent bystanders under
far broader circumstances. 38 What seems to be carrying the burden of
argument toward the relaxation of the war convention is the consideration
that in some circumstances the ratio of the evil that one perpetrates by
violating noncombatant immunity to the evil that one averts by this means
is sufficiently favorable that the violation is justified. If it is morally
acceptable, and perhaps obligatory, to attack and kill 100,000 innocent
German bystander civilians to prevent the murder of one million people,
then why isn't it equally permissible to attack and kill a single innocent
civilian bystander to prevent the murder of ten people? Whatever ratio of
evil perpetrated to evil avoided that justified violating noncombatant
immunity in the supreme emergency should similarly justify proportionately smaller violations, even where no supreme emergency looms.
Conclusion
My conclusion is that the right of noncombatant immunity has a more
restricted scope than is often supposed. It can be overridden by considerations of moral culpability and innocence, and unless we are absolutists,
family members would be permissible provided the proportionality condition is satisfied. The issue that arises here is whether or not it is correct to maintain that when one
drops a bomb on a house, killing its inhabitants, the deaths of those present who are not
the target of attack are only foreseen and not intended. See Philippa Foot, The Problem
of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, reprinted in PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND
VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

19-32 (1978) (discussing the problem of

closeness of descriptions).
37. See ANSCOMBE, supra note 12, and RAMSEY, supra note 11, chapter 8 for discussions of the arguement that the war convention should be obeyed regardless of the consequences. However, in these essays adherence to absolutism is supported by appeal to
religious premises and specifically to the imperative to trust in God, who has responsibility for the consequences.
38. The dogmatic-sounding statement in the text is supported as follows. Any proposed definition of absolute catastrophe or supreme emergency would necessarily
appear arbitrary. Wherever one draws the line that separates supreme emergency from
a lesser problem, the question arises, why draw the line there and not elsewhere?
Walzer provides no answer. A further difficulty is that wherever one draws the line, one
must justify the extraordinary difference in the permissibility status of a violation of
noncombatant immunity that occurs just below the line compared to a similar violation
that occurs just slightly above it. A deontological defense of my proposition that eschews
any brightline and avoids discontunities in moral judgment would be more compelling.
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can be overridden by the consideration that the consequences of respecting noncombatant immunity would be sufficiently bad. A theme in this
discussion has been that the issue of just cause takes priority in just war
theory casuistical judgment. What one may permissibly do to combatants
and noncombatants in the course of war depends to a very large extent on
the justice or injustice of one's cause. The lesson to be drawn is that one
cannot swiftly and easily infer from the fact that an enemy combatant
either attacks civilian noncombatants or kills captured soldiers that he is
fighting unjustly and committing a moral wrong by violating the right of
noncombatant immunity. These judgments always involve a complex balancing of opposing reasons. Moreover, they always rely on a prior judgment about which side, if any, is fighting in the service of a just cause in a
military conflict. This essay has not addressed the question of what constitutes a just cause that rationalizes military combat. By setting this issue to
the side in this essay I do not mean to convey any suggestion that this issue
is simple or easy. Finally, I should reiterate that this discussion has been
an internal exploration of just war theory and has not addressed the external issue whether just war theory sympathetically construed can withstand
criticism from rival moral approaches, such as consequentialism.

